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Abstract
This paper studies how sovereign risk – both fundamental and self-fulfilling – shapes
the cyclical behavior of optimal fiscal policy. We develop a model with endogenous default
costs where market sentiment can induce belief-driven debt rollover crises. Optimal taxes
and public spending are generally procyclical, but the incidence of rollover risk gives
rise to infrequent episodes of severely countercyclical fiscal activity. These endogenous
regime changes are associated with pronounced countercyclical changes in the level of
debt. Debt buildups are triggered already by relatively mild recessions, but successful
fiscal consolidations occur only in exceptionally good times.
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1 Introduction
A well-established stylized fact in international macroeconomics is the procyclical pattern of
fiscal policy in emerging economies. Different from advanced economies, fiscal policy in these
countries does not contribute to smoothing business cycle fluctuations over time but rather
exacerbates underlying boom-bust cycles. A common explanation for this phenomenon is that
governments in emerging countries have limited access to international borrowing, and partic-
ularly so in bad times. Hence, in order to confront concerns about the sustainability of their
public finances and to retain financial market access, they often impose contractionary fiscal
measures even during severe recessions (cf. Vegh and Vuletin, 2015; Born, Mueller, and Pfeifer,
2015). This fiscal procyclicality can be rationalized insofar as austerity in the form of spending
cuts or tax hikes helps to create better borrowing conditions as reflected by reduced sovereign
spreads. Importantly, however, these spreads are not only determined by fundamentals but
also subject to market sentiment (Calvo, 1988; Cole and Kehoe, 2000).1
In this paper we study how fundamental sovereign risk and market sentiment shape the
pattern of optimal debt issuance and the cyclical behavior of optimal fiscal policy. We develop a
model with distortionary taxation, government spending and endogeneous default costs driven
by disruptions to the import of intermediate inputs (cf. Mendoza and Yue, 2012). Market
sentiment can give rise to belief-driven debt rollover crises when international lenders lose
confidence in the government’s willingness to honor its liabilities and hence refuse rolling over
their debts (cf. Cole and Kehoe, 2000). When debt is sufficiently high and repayment of
the maturing liabilities is hence sufficiently costly, the inability to issue new debt gives the
government an incentive to default, thus making the investors’ initial loss of confidence a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Debt levels for which these self-fulfilling dynamics are possible fall into the
so-called crisis zone.2
1For example, a narrative advanced in the context of the recent European debt crisis has been that a (sudden)
loss of confidence in some countries’ capacity to serve their debt triggered a collapse of bond prices; this led to
the adoption of severe austerity measures, which further contracted economic activity. Similarly, the Mexican
debt crisis of 1994-95 saw the Mexican government unable to roll over its debt because of international investors’
pessimistic beliefs and was resolved only through an international rescue package (cf. Cole and Kehoe, 1996).
2In addressing self-fulfilling expectations as a source of macroeconomic instability, our multiple-equilibria
approach is related to, but conceptually distinct from, work on local (in)determinacy. For important applications
dealing with the interaction of sovereign risk and fiscal policy, see e.g. Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, and Mueller
(2013, 2014).
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At the heart of the fiscal policy problem is a trade-off between the government’s motives to
frontload and to smooth consumption: Increasing current consumption comes at the cost of
accumulating more debt and thus higher exposure to default risk, which makes future consump-
tion more volatile. To what extent this happens actually depends on the sources of sovereign
risk, and this is reflected in the pattern of optimal fiscal policy. We show that, while optimal
taxes and public spending are generally procyclical,3 the incidence of rollover risk gives rise to
occasional episodes of severely countercyclical fiscal activity. These episodes are manifestations
of endogenous regime switches when the economy enters or leaves the crisis zone. Below the
crisis zone, the government’s optimal fiscal policy during recessions is then expansionary. It
exploits its fiscal space in order to avoid an excessive depression in output and consumption,
even though this policy ultimately entails a transition into the crisis zone and hence a discon-
tinuous increase in sovereign risk and future borrowing costs. By contrast, within the crisis
zone, a sustained boom can induce the government to adopt a severely contractionary fiscal
stance. It reduces public spending and raises taxes in an effort to bring down debt to the point
where rollover risk is completely eliminated. This policy lowers the default premia charged by
international creditors and hence significantly reduces borrowing costs, which provides space for
future governments to reduce distortionary taxes. Fiscal austerity, if initiated during booms,
can thus be expansionary and facilitate consumption smoothing. The traditional rationale
for countercyclical fiscal policy familiar from advanced economies is therefore at work also in
our framework where fiscal policy is constrained by both solvency considerations and market
sentiment.
In addition to prescribing large and fast-paced debt dynamics during regime switches, our
results also uncover a fundamental asymmetry underlying the optimal fiscal policy: Large fiscal
expansions are triggered already by relatively mild (but sustained) recessions, whereas large
fiscal contractions are triggered only by exceptional boom episodes, that is, when output is
significantly above trend. Our normative results thus also facilitate a new perspective at em-
pirically observed debt dynamics. Absent rollover risk, Eaton-Gersovitz-type models prescribe
a procyclical debt policy, so that debt rises (falls) in good (bad) times. The empirical evidence,
however, indicates that large swings in public debt display a different, countercyclical pattern
3Throughout, we refer to procyclical fiscal policy as implying higher (lower) public spending and lower
(higher) tax rates in good (bad) times.
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(Abbas, Belhocine, El-Ganainy, and Horton, 2011). The endogenous regime switches in our
model are consistent with this and also with the finding that debt-consolidating fiscal austerity
programs pay off particularly if initial economic conditions are benign (Born, Mueller, and
Pfeifer, 2015).
The empirical relevance of the policy trade-off at play can also be illustrated with reference
to the Mexican debt crisis of 1994-95. Our theoretical model provides a structural account of
this crisis based on the idea that a countercyclical policy stance in the face of adverse economic
and political conditions led to the accumulation of debt, which entailed the economy’s entry
into the crisis zone. The induced regime switch was associated with a pronounced jump in
sovereign spreads and ended in a confidence crisis in the form of a series of failed debt auctions.
Despite the eventual crisis, our model rationalizes these dynamics as potentially optimal in
view of the government’s competing motives for frontloading versus smoothing consumption.
Our paper connects to an expanding literature investigating the role and properties of fiscal
policy in environments subject to sovereign risk. This literature has evolved into three main
directions. A first branch documents the empirical regularities of fiscal policy in emerging
economies and contrasts them to those observed in developed economies. A common theme
is that both public spending and taxes are procyclical in the former but much less so in the
latter group of countries (see e.g. Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Talvi and Vegh, 2005; Kaminsky,
Reinhart, and Vegh, 2005; Frankel, Vegh, and Vuletin, 2013; Vegh and Vuletin, 2015). The
explanations advanced to rationalize this pattern include weak political institutions and tax
enforcement, incomplete markets and borrowing constraints (see e.g. Tornell and Lane, 1999;
Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza, 2010; Ilzetzki, 2011; Bauducco and Caprioli, 2014). Relatedly,
a second strand employs models of sovereign default to examine the relationship between fiscal
rules or restrictions, bailouts and conditionality imposed by international financial institutions
(see e.g. Juessen and Schabert, 2013; Goncalves and Guimaraes, 2015; Hatchondo, Martinez,
and Roch, 2015; Fink and Scholl, 2016; Arellano and Bai, 2017). Finally, a third branch inte-
grates fiscal policy into dynamic models of endogenous sovereign default from the perspective
of optimal taxation with or without commitment (see e.g. Adam and Grill, 2017; Pouzo and
Presno, 2015; Niemann and Pichler, 2017).
Most closely related to our work are the papers by Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010)
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and Cole and Kehoe (2000). Like us, Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010) consider a small
open economy model where not only the repayment of debt but also taxes and public spending
are endogenously chosen by the government in a time-consistent fashion. They consider only
fundamental default risk and obtain fiscal procyclicality in a framework with exogenous default
costs as in Arellano (2008). By contrast, our approach allows us to examine the interaction
between fiscal policy and endogenous default costs and accommodates self-fulfilling debt crises,
which we show to have important consequences for optimal fiscal policies. Our detailed account
of fiscal policy and default costs also differentiates our work from Cole and Kehoe (2000) from
whom we borrow the foundation for rollover risk. While distortionary, taxation in their model
is limited to a time-invariant income tax; likewise, productivity is not stochastic and, following
default, subject to a permanent exogenous reduction. Instead, our paper integrates flexible and
optimally determined fiscal policy into a fully-fledged stochastic environment, which facilitates
the quantitative assessment of its properties in normal times and during crisis and transition
episodes. This has important implications. Whereas Cole and Kehoe (2000) establish that,
generically, the optimal policy is to escape the crisis zone by decumulating debt, our model of
optimal fiscal policy rationalizes persistent debt positions within the crisis zone as the generic
outcome, which is broken only through rare regime changes following exceptional productivity
dynamics. Finally, in a variation of the setup with time-invariant taxation in Cole and Kehoe
(2000), Conesa and Kehoe (2017) obtain debt dynamics driven by the government’s motive in
recessions to ‘gamble for redemption’, which may result in a transition into the crisis zone. This
is similar to our model, which, however, features empirically plausible productivity dynamics
and thus also the potential for transitions out of the crisis zone, and in addition details the
dynamic pattern of (variable) taxation and spending during these regime switches.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our formal model environ-
ment, and Section 3 presents conditions characterizing optimal fiscal policy. Section 4 calibrates
the model to data for the Mexican economy. Section 5 presents the results of our quantita-
tive exercise, and Section 6 compares them to the empirically observed dynamics during the
Mexican debt crisis of 1994-95. Section 7 concludes.
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2 The model
Our model extends the framework by Mendoza and Yue (2012) by introducing fiscal policy,
in the form of public spending and a linear consumption tax, as well as the possibility of self-
fulfilling rollover crises. We consider a small open economy populated by households, firms and
a sovereign government which borrows from foreign lenders. Production is organized in two
sectors, a sector f of final goods producers and a sector m of intermediate goods producers.
Time is discrete, t = 0, 1, 2, ....
2.1 Private sector





βtu(ct − v(Lt), gt), (1)
where gt denotes valued public expenditure and β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor. The period
utility function u(·) has standard properties and is separable in its two arguments; the first
term complies with the specification in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) which
removes the wealth effect on labor supply. Households take as given the wage rate wt, firm
profits πft and π
m
t in the two sectors, and the consumption tax τt.
4 Since households do not
participate in intertemporal asset markets,5 their problem consists of maximizing (1) subject












4Unlike advanced economies, developing countries rely more on indirect taxation, particularly the value-
added tax (VAT). For Mexico, Vegh and Vuletin (2015) report the percentage of total tax revenues attributable
to the taxation of goods and services at 73.2%.
5The assumption that households cannot borrow directly on international financial markets is widely adopted
in the sovereign debt literature. Lahiri, Singh, and Vegh (2007) point out that, in general, only a fraction of
households have access to asset markets, and that even in the US the degree of asset market segmentation
is remarkably high. Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003, 2014) report that, historically, private foreign
borrowing amounts to less than 10% of total foreign borrowing in more than two thirds of developing countries.
Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010) provide some further discussion. While their baseline model does not allow
for private borrowing on international markets, they also study an alternative model with private borrowing
and find that their baseline results remain qualitatively unaffected.
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Final goods producers. Competitive firms in the f sector combine labor Lft , intermediate
goods Mt and a time-invariant capital stock k to produce finals goods. The production function








))αM (Lft )αL kαk , (4)
where αM , αL, αk ∈ (0, 1) and αM +αL+αk = 1. The mix of intermediate inputs is determined









+ (1− λ) (m∗t )
µ] 1µ (5)
with weight λ ∈ [0, 1), implying an elasticity of substitution of ηmd,m∗ =
∣∣∣ 1µ−1 ∣∣∣. Imported inputs,
in turn, are given by a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator combining a continuum of differentiated varieties
















A subset Ω of the imported input varieties, defined by the interval [0, θ] with θ ∈ (0, 1), must
be financed in advance via working capital loans κt. The timing protocol is such that these
within-period loans are contracted after uncertainty about productivity and the government’s
repayment decision concerning its current debt service has been resolved. As Mendoza and
Yue (2012) we assume that the availability of working capital loans to firms conditions on the
government’s access to international financial markets. Following a sovereign default, working
capital loans become unavailable throughout the period of market exclusion. When the govern-
ment repays, firms can contract loans at the risk-free world interest rate r∗t ; in this case, their
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where p∗j denotes the exogenous, time-invariant price of the imported input variety j ∈ [0, 1].







the price of domestic inputs, as given. Profits in the final goods sector are given by
















































price index for imported inputs resulting from CES aggregation. The first-order conditions









































m∗t for j ∈ [0, θ]. (13)
The expressions in (8), (9), (12) and (13) implicitly assume that the government and firms have
access to capital markets. When the country is in default, the relevant price index for imported
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m∗t , for j ∈ [θ, 1], (14)
m∗jt = 0 for j ∈ [0, θ]. (15)
Intermediate goods producers. Competitive firms in the m sector use labor Lmt to











γ − wtLmt . (17)




γ−1 = wt. (18)






and that GDP, the value of the output of final goods net of the costs of imported inputs, is
given by
gdpt = yt − P ∗t m∗t . (20)
2.2 Sovereign government and foreign lenders
The sovereign government implements consumption taxes τt, provides public spending gt and
can borrow and lend in international credit markets. Let bt+1 denote the amount of debt issued
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in period t. Financial markets are incomplete because the government can issue only one-period,
non-state-contingent discount bonds. The government cannot commit to repay its debt. Each
period, conditional on being in good credit standing, the government chooses between honoring
its outstanding foreign debt or defaulting on it. The government’s inability to commit is the
reason why borrowing from international creditors is also subject to self-fulfilling rollover risk:
The fear of a future default may prompt lenders not to extend new credit, which in turn may
induce an immediate default by the government. There is thus scope for fundamental defaults,
driven by the government’s willingness to repay, and self-fulfilling rollover crises, driven by a
coordination failure between the government and its foreign lenders.
Irrespective of its ultimate source, the consequences of debt repudiation are always the same.
Default wipes out the entirety of the government’s outstanding debt at the cost of financial
autarky, that is, exclusion from international credit markets. When in bad credit standing,
the government may regain access to international credit markets in the next period with an
exogenous probability φ. The government’s default decision therefore trades off the direct
costs of the resource transfer to international lenders associated with the repayment of the
its non-contingent debt against the costs of temporary exclusion from credit markets given by
the foregone benefits of consumption smoothing and the output loss in autarky due to the
non-availability of working capital to firms.
The government’s intertemporal problem can be expressed in recursive form. The fundamen-
tal state variables are the government’s inherited bond position b and the current productivity
level ε. In order to examine the implications of rollover risk, we follow Chatterjee and Eyi-
gungor (2012) and consider the following static coordination game played at the beginning of
each period between the sovereign government and foreign lenders.6 The government faces
some maturing debt b and, conditional on redeeming its current liabilities, seeks to issue new
bonds. Table 1 details the relevant payoff matrix, whereby columns correspond to the sovereign
government’s strategies, and rows correspond to the lenders’ strategies. If lenders extend new
credit (rollover) and the government repays its maturing debt (repay), the former earn a net
return of zero (that is, in expectation lenders earn the return r∗ which is also the opportunity
6For simplicity, and as in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), we abstract from the coordination problem
between multiple lenders and assume they act in a coordinated fashion. In Cole and Kehoe (2000), the game is
played between the sovereign and many lenders acting independently.
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Table 1: Payoff matrix for static coordination game
repay default
rollover 0, Vnd(b, ε) −r∗/(1 + r∗)∆, Vd(ε)
crisis 0, Vc(b, ε) 0, Vd(ε)
cost of their funds), and the latter receives the payoff under repayment and new borrowing,
denoted by Vnd(b, ε). If lenders extend new credit and the government defaults (default), we
assume that the new borrowing is returned to the lenders without it earning any interest; the
(discounted) loss of interest earnings then is r∗/(1 + r∗)∆, where ∆ is the amount of new
lending. If lenders fail to provide new credit (crisis), their payoff is zero irrespective of the
government’s behavior. In this case, if the government repays but cannot borrow, it receives
Vc(b, ε) ≤ Vnd(b, ε).7 And if the government defaults, its payoff does not depend on the level
of maturing debt and is given by Vd(ε).
We assume indifference on the side of the government or lenders is always resolved in fa-
vor of repayment and extending new credit, respectively. Depending on the value of Vd(ε),
the game then has the following set of Nash equilibria. If Vd(ε) ≤ Vc(b, ε) ≤ Vnd(b, ε),
the unique equilibrium is (rollover, repay); if Vc(b, ε) ≤ Vnd(b, ε) < Vd(ε), the unique equi-
librium is (crisis, default); and if Vc(b, ε) < Vd(ε) ≤ Vnd(b, ε), both (rollover, repay) and
(crisis, default) are equilibria. In the last case, we assume that the equilibrium is selected
depending on the realization of a sunspot variable, denoted ξ. If ξ = 0, the (rollover, repay)
equilibrium is selected, and if ξ = 1, the (crisis, default) equilibrium is selected. The latter
case corresponds to a self-fulfilling rollover crisis where lenders refuse to lend because they
believe that the sovereign will default, and the sovereign defaults because it believes that the
lenders will refuse to lend. We assume the sunspot variable ξ is i.i.d. and takes value one with
probability p.
Let V(b, ε, ξ) denote the value function of the government, which depends on the fundamental
states (b, ε) and the sunspot variable ξ. If the government has access to credit and does not
7The weak inequality holds because the policy when fresh borrowing is allowed can always replicate the
policy without borrowing, or even do better.
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default, it can issue new debt and finance expenditures subject to the following constraint,
g = τc+ q(b′, ε)b′ − b, (21)
where q(b′, ε) is the bond pricing function, which is taken as given by the government. When
implementing its policy, the government also needs to take into account the private sector’s
response given by the set of optimality conditions
End = {(2), (3), (4), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (16), (18), (19)} .
Thus, the government problem conditional on repayment is
Vnd(b, ε) = max
τ,g,b′
{u(c− v(L), g) + βE [(1− p)V(b′, ε′, 0) + pV(b′, ε′, 1)]} (22)
subject to (21) and End. By contrast, if the government defaults, it is temporarily excluded
from international credit markets and faces the constraint
g = τc, (23)
and the private-sector optimality conditions Ed, where, relative to End, κ = 0, the import price





u(c− v(L), g) + βE
[
(1− φ)Vd(ε′) + φ [(1− p)V(0, ε′, 0) + pV(0, ε′, 1)]
]}
(24)
subject to (23) and Ed. And similarly, the value function when international lenders refuse to
extend new credit is given by
Vc(b, ε) = max
τ,g
{u(c− v(L), g) + βE [(1− p)V(0, ε′, 0) + pV(0, ε′, 1)]} (25)
subject to g = τc − b and Ed. Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that final goods
firms do not have access to working capital loans when lenders refuse to buy government bonds.
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This parallels our earlier assumptions about the consequences of sovereign default.8
Given Vnd(b, ε), Vd(ε) and Vc(b, ε), the government’s value function is determined as
V(b, ε, ξ) =

Vnd(b, ε), if Vd(ε) ≤ Vc(b, ε) and ξ ∈ {0, 1},
Vd(ε), if Vnd(b, ε) < Vd(ε) and ξ ∈ {0, 1},
Vnd(b, ε), if Vc(b, ε) < Vd(ε) ≤ Vnd(b, ε) and ξ = 0,
Vd(ε), if Vc(b, ε) < Vd(ε) ≤ Vnd(b, ε) and ξ = 1.
(26)
The optimal default policy under rollover risk can be characterized with reference to (26) as
D(b, ε, ξ) =
 0, if V(b, ε, ξ) = Vnd(b, ε),1, if V(b, ε, ξ) = Vd(ε). (27)
This determines a default set, the set of productivity realizations such that, given the sunspot
and current debt, default is optimal,
Γ(b, ξ) = {ε : D(b, ε, ξ) = 1} . (28)
Moreover, given current productivity ε and some debt policy b′, the probability of default
in the next period can be inferred from the default set and the transition process z(ε′|ε) for
productivity as







Bond prices are determined by international lenders, who are risk-neutral and have complete
information. Facing an opportunity cost of funds equal to r∗, they invest in one-period sovereign
bonds and in within-period private working capital loans. Competition implies that lenders
expect zero profits and that the returns on sovereign debt and the world’s risk-free asset are
8Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a) relate this form of contagion to the private sector to the phenomenon
of a ‘sovereign ceiling’ and argue that it played an important role during the Mexican debt crisis of 1994-95.
More generally, Mendoza and Yue (2012) discuss the empirical comovement between corporate and sovereign
interest rates, reporting a median correlation of 0.7 for a sample of emerging markets (1994-2005).
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Accordingly, the equilibrium bond price q(b′, ε) reflects the risk of sovereign default.
Equilibrium. In equilibrium, private-sector allocations are optimal, given the policies im-
plemented by the government; the government’s debt, default and fiscal policy are optimal
subject to the relevant implementability constraints and the bond pricing function q(b′, ε); and
foreign lenders are optimizing.
3 Optimal fiscal policy
We now examine the properties of optimal fiscal policy. A first result is that the monotonicity
of the optimal (discretionary) default policy, which is familiar from models following Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981), is preserved also in the presence of optimal fiscal policy.
Proposition 1. Given a productivity shock ε and a pair of debt positions b and b̃ such that
b > b̃ ≥ 0, if default is optimal for b̃, then it is optimal also for b. That is, Γ(b̃, ξ) ⊆ Γ(b, ξ).
Since bond prices compensate for default risk, it follows that, for given current productivity,
they must also be monotonic in the amount of debt issued. Indeed, the government’s lack of
commitment matters only if bond prices react to debt. This is because both taxation and public
spending affect only the static equilibrium conditions. The following proposition characterizes
the government’s optimal tax and spending policy.






















which implies underprovision of public spending, uc < ug.
This condition has an interpretation in terms of marginal benefits and marginal costs of chang-
ing the tax rate. Variations in the government’s tax policy are then seen to have two effects:
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< 0). In detail,
for given GDP, an increase in the tax rate allows to reallocate resources from private to public
consumption. However, this causes tax distortions which work to reduce GDP, the relevant tax
base for the consumption tax, and thus has negative implications for the government’s budget.
In conjunction, these effects imply that the optimal fiscal policy limits distortions by keeping
public expenditure below its first-best level.
To build intuition, it is also useful to consider the generalized Euler equation characterizing
the government’s optimal debt policy.9











An immediate implication of the generalized Euler equation is that increasing debt can only be
optimal for the government if this generates additional resources, that is, q + ∂q
∂b′
b′ > 0. So the
optimal debt policy can never be subject to a debt Laffer curve. More generally, the generalized
Euler equation balances today’s marginal benefit of additional borrowing against the discounted
marginal cost of higher debt tomorrow. The marginal benefit values with the marginal utility
of public spending the additional resources available to the government from issuing an extra
unit of debt. The marginal cost of higher inherited liabilities is to reduce the resources available
for future public spending. Notice, however, that the possibility of a future default implies that
the government takes this cost into account only for states which actually induce repayment.10
Since the government will exercise its default option exactly in times when repayment would
be associated with an excessively high marginal utility from public spending, this conditioning
implies Eξ′Eε′ 6∈Γ(b′,ξ′)u
′
g ≤ Eξ′Eε′u′g̃, where Eξ′Eε′u′g̃ is the marginal utility under the suboptimal
policy dictating repayment in all states (ε, ξ). How the government resolves the intertemporal
trade-off underlying its debt policy therefore depends on the strength of its effective fronloading
9Technically, this presumes differentiability of the bond pricing function q(b′, ε) and the value function
Vnd(b, ε). Notice therefore that the generalized Euler equation is presented merely to illustrate the intertemporal
policy trade-off facing the government. We do not claim or prove differentiability, and also our numerical
approach and quantitative results do not rest on it.
10Key to this result is the fact that the level of maturing debt becomes irrelevant in the event of default. It
therefore also does not matter whether a default occurs for fundamental or self-fulfilling reasons.
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motive, as captured by its discount factor β and the reduction in the expected future marginal
utility via the option value of default.
4 Calibration
We now study the model’s quantitative implications in a calibrated environment. We target
data for Mexico, covering the period 1980:Q1 to 2018:Q4, for two reasons. First, given our
emphasis on fiscal policy, we can rely on time series data for public finances, whose availabil-
ity and quality is better in Mexico compared to many other emerging economies including
Argentina.11 Second, the Mexican debt crisis of 1994-95 is widely interpreted as driven by
self-fulfilling dynamics of the sort considered in our model. Notice also that, at that time,
the maturity structure of sovereign debt was very short, with the majority of bonds having a
maturity of just 91 days and overall maturity averaging at barely 200 days (Cole and Kehoe,
1996). Our quarterly model with one-period debt is thus a good approximation.
Similar to Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010), the period utility function in (1) is assumed
to take the following form,













Accordingly, the contributions of public expenditures and the consumption-leisure composite
to utility are subject to the same intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1
σ
and are aggregated
with relative weights (1−π) and π. Labor supply is characterized by a constant Frisch elasticity
of 1
ω−1 . Productivity shocks in final goods production follow an AR(1) process,
ln ε′ = ρε ln ε+ ε
′, (32)
where ρε ∈ (0, 1) denotes the autocorrelation of productivity, and E(ε) = 0 and E(ε2) = σε.
The benchmark parameterization for our quarterly model is summarized in Table 2. Param-
eters above the line are calibrated. The curvature parameters are set to σ = 2 and ω = 1.455,
corresponding to a Frisch elasticity of 1
ω−1 = 2.2. These are standard values in quantitative
11Appendix A.3 describes the employed data in detail.
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Table 2: Parameter values
Parameter Value Source / Target statistics
Inverse Frisch elasticity ω 1.455 Standard value
Inverse of intertemporal elasticity σ 2 Standard value
of consumption
Autocorrelation of TFP shock ρε 0.95 Standard value
Risk-free rate r∗ 0.01 Standard value
Reentry probability φ 0.083 Standard value
Armington weight λ 0.62 Mendoza and Yue (2012)
of domestic inputs
Armington curvature µ 0.65 Mendoza and Yue (2012)
Dixit-Stiglitz curvature ν 0.59 Mendoza and Yue (2012)
Working capital to GDP ratio θ 0.7 Mendoza and Yue (2012)
International goods share in gross αM 0.43 Mendoza and Yue (2012)
output of final goods
Labor share in gross output αL 0.26 Labor income share in GDP (0.46)
of final goods
Labor share in production γ 0.46 Labor income share in GDP (0.46)
of intermediate goods
Private cons. weight in utility π 0.914 Public-private consumption ratio (0.2)
Intermed. sector productivity A 0.140 Quarterly output drop in default (5.7%)
Standard dev. of TFP shock σε 0.009 GDP standard dev. (0.022)
Discount factor β 0.965 Priv. consumption standard dev. (0.0265)
Sunspot probability p 0.015 Average annual spread (3.64%)
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studies of sovereign default and international real business cycles (Mendoza, 1991; Neumeyer
and Perri, 2005; Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza, 2010; Mendoza and Yue, 2012). Similarly, with
ρε = 0.95 for the autocorrelation of productivity shocks, and r
∗ = 1% for the risk-free interest
rate, we assign standard parameter values for our quarterly model. Finally, the probability of
reentry after default is set at φ = 0.083; the implied average exclusion period of three years
is consistent with relevant empirial estimates (Dias and Richmond, 2009; Gelos, Sahay, and
Sandleris, 2011; Cruces and Trebesch, 2013).
Our calibration of the parameters relating to the aggregation of intermediate inputs in (5)
and (6) follows Mendoza and Yue (2012) who recur on Mexican data (1988-2004) and infer
λ = 0.62 and µ = 0.65 from optimality conditions (9) and (10).12 There is thus a small bias in
favor of domestic relative to imported inputs, and the elasticity of substitution between them
is ηmd,m∗ =
1
1−µ = 2.86. The parameter ν is pinned down by the elasticity of substitution across
imported varieties, which – building on evidence reported in Gopinath and Neiman (2014) –
is set at ηm∗j =
1
1−ν = 2.44 as in Mendoza and Yue (2012); this implies ν = 0.59. Finally,
the target for θ is the share of working capital financing in GDP. As Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2007) and Mendoza and Yue (2012), we proxy working capital by the fraction of M1 held by
firms, whereby we rely on an estimate for the US showing that firms hold about two-thirds of
M1. On the basis of this strategy, our estimate for the importance of working capital results
in θ = 0.7. The share of intermediate goods in gross output is set to αM = 0.43 as in Mendoza
and Yue (2012). We assume identical labor shares in the final (f) and intermediate (m) goods
sectors. We set γ = 0.46, which, according to OECD’s Unit Labour Costs Annual Indicators
data, is the average labor income share in Mexico during the period 1980-2009.13 A labor
income share in value added of the f sector of αL
1−αM
= γ = 0.46 then implies αL = 0.26. Under
constant returns to scale in the f sector, we finally have αk = 1− αM − αL = 0.31.
Parameters below the line are set with SMM, similar to Mendoza and Yue (2012). Given
the other parameter values assigned in (31), the preference weight is obtained as π = 0.914,
which generates a ratio of public to private consumption of 20%, the mean value observed in
Mexico (1980-2018). The productivity process in (32) is approximated by a discrete first-order
12These two values allow their model to match the average ratios in Mexican data of imported to domestic
inputs at current and constant prices, which are 18% and 15.7%, respectively.
13Unlike the other data, this statistic is only available until 2009.
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Markov chain with 25 values using the procedure in Tauchen (1986). Given ρε = 0.95, the
volatility parameter is set at σε = 0.009 to target the standard deviation of quarterly GDP in
Mexico, which is 2.19%. The remaining parameters A, β and p are chosen to target the decline
in output at default, which is 5.74% in the data;14 the standard deviation of HP-detrended
private consumption, which is 2.65%; and the average annualized interest rate spread, which
equals 3.64% in the EMBI data covering the period 1994-2018. Given these targets, the SMM
procedure yields A = 0.14, β = 0.965 and p = 0.015.
Some comments are in order. While our calibration of the discount factor at β = 0.965 is
quite high in comparison to much of the sovereign default literature (e.g. Mendoza and Yue,
2012 calibrate β = 0.88), it remains low relative to the values typically assigned in quarterly
business cycle models. This has two consequences for the simulation of our model and its quan-
titative interpretation. On the one hand, since the sovereign government is relatively patient,
its frontloading motive is weaker than in most comparable papers concerned with short-term
sovereign debt. Hence, the accumulation of debt remains moderate and the model generates
relatively few fundamental default episodes. In order to match the empirically observed interest
rate spreads, rollover risk driven by sunspots must fill the gap. We see this as an interesting
and empirically relevant feature of our model, which has important implications for the optimal
conduct of fiscal policy. On the other hand, annual discount rates implied by β are still very
high at around 15%. This seems hard to justify simply on the grounds of politico-economic
distortions. The meaningful analysis of the trade-offs shaping optimal fiscal policy hence calls
for consideration also of alternative environments with a more or less dominant frontloading
motive.
5 Results
In this section we present the results of our quantitative analysis. We start by establishing
the existence of a crisis zone, that is, a region of the state space where self-fulfilling debt
crises are possible, and examine the implications for the pricing of sovereign debt. We then
14In line with our model, the targeted default event is the Mexican rollover crisis in December 1994 and
January 1995. The empirical measure for the output drop is the contraction of real GDP (seasonally adjusted)
observed between 1994:Q4 and 1995:Q1.
19
move on to discuss the business cycle implications of our model and show that optimal fiscal
policy is generally procyclical. Finally, we show that there are infrequent episodes of severely
countercyclical fiscal policy, which occur when the economy moves into our out of the crisis
zone, and we examine in detail the economic conditions underlying these regime shift events.
5.1 Crisis zone and bond prices
As in Cole and Kehoe (2000), the state space (b, ε) in our model can be partitioned into three
zones: the safe zone where the government always prefers to honor its maturing debt, the
default zone where the government always prefers default, and the crisis zone where there is
scope for self-fulfilling debt crises. Figure 1 visualizes the different zones when β = 0.965. The









































Figure 1: Crisis and default zones under optimal fiscal policy
crisis threshold moves from about 10.5% to about 13.5% of quarterly GDP (2.6% to about
3.4% of annual GDP) when TFP ranges within two standard deviations of its mean.15 When
debt exceeds this threshold, self-fulfilling sovereign debt crises may occur depending on the
realization of the sunspot variable ξ. The default threshold is in the order of magnitude of 10%
to 11% of annual GDP. Interestingly, the default threshold expressed in terms of a debt-to-GDP
ratio is (slightly) non-monotonic in TFP. This is because in low TFP states the direct effect of
increasing productivity on GDP is stronger than its effect on sustainable debt. Maybe more
15These low values need to be put in context of our model with one-period debt only, where the level of
outstanding debt has an interpretation as debt service, that is, the volume of debt that needs to be rolled over
period by period.
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importantly, Figure 1 illustrates that the crisis zone in our model is pervasive, so that rollover
risk is a concern over a large part of the relevant state space.
This has important implications for the behavior of bond prices. Panel (a) of Figure 2 plots
the bond pricing function (30) against the level of debt for different levels of productivity ε.
As seen, there are two regions where bond prices display a strong sensitivity to the amount of




































(b) Debt policy function
Figure 2: Bond pricing and debt policy functions
debt issued. The first drop in bond prices occurs when the economy approaches the crisis zone
and default risk rises from zero to p. The second drop arises due to the surge in default risk
when the country approaches the default zone.16
This begs the question of how rollover risk is addressed by optimal fiscal policy. Panel (b) of
Figure 2 displays the debt policy function when ε = 1. There emerge two fixed points, which
are located, respectively, just below the crisis and default thresholds (dashed horizontal lines).
Absent (substantial) shocks, the economy can thus linger in either the safe zone or the crisis
zone for extended periods. Given the government’s relative impatience and the local invariance
of rollover risk p to the level of debt, there is a tendency to accumulate liabilities within either
zone. This is countered only by the threat of a regime shift, that is, a transition from the
safe zone into the crisis zone or a fundamental default event. Since this transition or default
risk is incorporated into bond prices, there is a precautionary motive keeping the fixed points
somewhat below the the relevant thresholds.
16Similar two-step bond pricing functions can arise also in the context of default models with political risk
(Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza, 2009; Scholl, 2017), when the hazard of turnover to a more default-prone
government induces bond prices akin to those depicted in Figure 2.
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5.2 Fiscal procyclicality
Table 3 presents business cycle statistics generated from simulations of our model and compares
them to quarterly data from Mexico (1980-2018). For our baseline model (column two), the
average level of debt over GDP is around 6.2%, which is well within the crisis zone. Notice,
however, that this statistic is computed as the weighted average across different regimes. In
particular, the economy spends about 50% of the time in the crisis zone, and about 40% in the
safe zone. The transition frequencies confirm our earlier observation that there is substantial
persistence within these zones; regime shifts thus are rare events. Crisis zone entries happen
endogenously with an unconditional probability of 0.81% per quarter. By contrast, exits from
the crisis zone happen exclusively via sovereign default (with an unconditional probability of
0.78%). The optimal policy under our baseline calibration with β = 0.965 is therefore not
to escape the crisis zone via debt decumulation as in Cole and Kehoe (2000). Instead, the
government’s debt policy entails occasional transitions into the crisis zone where the economy
subsequently persists despite the risk of self-fulfilling crises.
Table 3 shows further that our benchmark model reproduces several salient features of the
Mexican business cycle: Interest rate spreads and both private and public consumption are
more volatile than GDP, whereas taxes and the trade balance are less volatile.17 The pattern
of correlations implied by our model shows that default risk is countercyclical. This induces
a procyclical debt policy, which manifests itself in a countercyclical trade balance. Despite
this, spreads are countercyclical and positively correlated with the trade balance. Key to this
correlation pattern is the convexity of the default costs in the underlying productivity state.
Following Mendoza and Yue (2012), our model generates this structure endogenously. Turning
to the cyclical properties of the other fiscal instruments, we see that public spending displays
a tight positive correlation with GDP, whereas tax rates display a negative correlation.
Underlying these properties of optimal fiscal policy is the trade-off between the government’s
motives to frontload and to smooth consumption. The last three columns of Table 3 therefore
explore the robustness of our results to variations in the relative importance of the govern-
17Note that the volatility of spreads is slightly lower than in the data. Given the relatively low volatility
of Mexican GDP (in comparison to e.g. Argentina), which informs our calibration of the TFP process, this
moderate shortfall in the spread volatility is to some extent expected; compare e.g. the discussion in Aguiar,
Chatterjee, Cole, and Stangebye (2016).
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Table 3: Business cycle statistics
Data Model Variations
β = 0.95 β = 0.967 β = 0.98
Standard deviation (×100)
GDP 2.19 2.18 2.48 2.05 1.95
C 2.65 2.55 3.29 2.30 2.05
G 2.42 2.89 3.70 2.52 2.30
TB 1.48 0.90 1.28 0.60 0.24
τ 1.13 1.03 1.43 0.73 0.31
Rs 3.03 2.34 1.04 1.50 0.01
Correlation with GDP
C 0.84 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.99
G 0.40 0.84 0.88 0.85 0.87
TB -0.59 -0.27 -0.52 -0.31 -0.37
τ -0.17 -0.28 -0.52 -0.31 -0.36
Rs -0.48 -0.24 -0.31 -0.22 -0.40
GDPt−1 0.82 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.67
Correlation with spread
C -0.54 -0.22 -0.33 -0.20 -0.41
G -0.21 -0.16 -0.27 -0.12 -0.29
TB 0.50 0.06 0.27 0.04 0.18
Average
External public debt∗ (% of annual GDP) 19.1 (12.6) 6.18 8.69 4.26 2.79
Interest spread (annualized, %) 3.64 3.60 6.18 1.53 0.01
Output drop in default (%) 5.74 5.70 5.83 5.67 9.46
Quarterly frequency (%) of
Default 0.78 1.25 0.34 0.00
Crisis zone entry 0.81 1.25 0.40 0.01
Crisis zone exit (non-default) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Fraction (%) of time spent in
Autarky 9.18 14.94 3.88 0.03
Safe zone (excluding autarky) 39.68 2.62 73.68 99.81
Crisis zone 51.13 82.44 22.44 0.16
Note: Model statistics are computed as averages from N = 20.000 simulations of length T = 160, including default events
and subsequent autarky spells. Observed and simulated data for GDP, public consumption and private consumption are
logged and detrended using the HP-filter; tax rates and the trade balance are detrended in levels. The empirical measure
for tax rates is constructed using data on revenues from VAT taxes, income taxes, excise taxes and the inflation tax; see
Appendix A.3.1 for further details.
∗ External public debt is measured by external broad economic debt of the public sector (series SG 195) or, in parentheses,
by external broad economic debt of the public sector consolidated with Banco de México (series SG 201).
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ment’s frontloading motive. Compared to our baseline calibration with β = 0.965, column four
with β = 0.967 constitutes only a minor perturbation. By contrast, columns three and five
report outcomes under a relatively strong frontloading motive (β = 0.95) and a relatively weak
frontloading motive (β = 0.98). As seen, variations in β have relevant consequences for average
debt positions, interest rate spreads and transition frequencies between the safe zone and the
crisis zone. But the basic pattern of business cycle statistics from our baseline calibration with
β = 0.965 remains intact across all considered parameterizations. Fiscal policy in our model is
thus generally procyclical.18
A closer look reveals, however, that the presence of rollover risk gives rise to infrequent
episodes of strongly countercyclical fiscal policy. Figure 3 shows, for exemplary simulations,
the debt positions generated under the alternative model specifications, together with the rel-
evant crisis and default thresholds. Panel (a) considers the case when β = 0.95 so that the
government’s frontloading motive is very pronounced. As seen, the simulated debt positions
are generally close to the default threshold. There is a tight comovement between the two time
series, which illustrates again the procyclical nature of both the government’s borrowing and
its incentives to repay. However, in rare instances, self-fulfilling rollover crises or strong con-
tractions in productivity and GDP trigger episodes of sovereign default, which lead to periods
of market exclusion. But once the government regains access to international capital markets,
debt positions are fast to reach the vicinity of the default threshold again. Moreover, under the
optimal fiscal policy, there is no attempt to escape the crisis zone.
By contrast, panel (d) examines the situation for β = 0.98, implying a relatively weak
frontloading motive. Debt positions are again procyclical but now remain below the crisis zone.
This is because default risk and bond prices would jump discontinuously if the country were
to enter the crisis zone. The government thus limits its borrowing and eliminates default risk
almost completely.19
The most interesting dynamics arise for intermediate discount factors when β = 0.965 or
β = 0.967. With a difference in implied annual discount rates of less than one percentage
18In this respect, our findings confirm the results in Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010), though for an
environment with rollover risk and endogenous default costs. Notice also that variations in β actually have a
non-monotonic effect on the degree of procyclicality in taxation; this can be explained through the changing
incidence of market exclusion.
19Some minimal default risk remains due to the small hazard of a transition into the crisis zone.
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Figure 3: Debt, crisis threshold and default threshold for varying discount factor
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point, the variation in relative impatience across these alternative intermediate specifications
is quite small. Nevertheless, it has profound implications for the conduct of optimal fiscal
policy. In both cases, realized debt positions over the simulations actually display considerable
persistence both within the safe zone and the crisis zone. But we also observe endogenous regime
switches where the government enters or escapes the crisis zone. Below the crisis threshold,
the government will normally limit borrowing in order to prevent rollover risk – similar to
panel (d). But above the crisis threshold, it will normally not be willing to shoulder the cost
of decumulating debt; instead, since the degree of rollover risk does not vary within the crisis
zone, debt levels converge close to the default threshold – similar to panel (a). Occasionally,
however, the government finds it worthwhile to engineer a transition into or out of the crisis
zone. Notice that entry events are recorded both for β = 0.965 and β = 0.967. By contrast,
endogenous exits materialize only in panel (c), that is, for the specification with slightly reduced
impatience (β = 0.967).20 The next section looks at the economic conditions triggering these
transition events and the associated dynamics of fiscal policy in greater detail.
5.3 Countercyclical fiscal expansions and contractions
It is instructive to assess the transition dynamics through the lense of the optimality condition
presented in Proposition 3. Presuming differentiability (again, this is just done to ease inter-





≤ 0 as the elasticity of bond prices with respect to debt
issuance, this condition can be rewritten as






Accordingly, the intertemporal smoothing of the marginal utility from public spending is com-
plicated by three potential factors. On the right-hand side of (33), both the government’s
relative impatience, β/q ≈ β(1 + r∗) < 1, and the insurance value implied by its future default
option, Eξ′Eε′ 6∈Γ(b′,ξ′)u
′
g ≤ Eξ′Eε′u′g̃, provide incentives for higher current spending (lower ug).
20For β = 0.967, the model delivers endogenous transitions in both directions, though exit events remain
extremely rare; see the unconditional transition frequencies reported in Table 3. This difference to the baseline
calibration with β = 0.965 can be traced back to the respective debt policy functions, which are provided in
Figure 8 in Appendix A.2.
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Such policy comes at the cost of increased debt and consequently lower bond prices, εq(b
′) ≤ 0.
Starting in the safe zone, these forces can dominate the government’s precautionary motive
and instead make it worthwhile to risk a transition into the crisis zone. Different from the
default frontier, bond prices at the crisis threshold are locally very sensitive to the level of debt,
but then flatten out and do not fall to zero (see Figure 2). This is because the crisis risk is
small (p = 0.015) and invariant to the level of debt. As a consequence, the effect on bond
prices remains limited so that the joint effect of impatience and the option value of default can
render a probabilistic (namely after a sufficiently bad productivity shock) transition into the
crisis zone optimal. A similar logic applies to transitions out of the crisis zone, although the
government’s relative impatience makes them less likely. In this light, Figures 4 and 6 illustrate
the model’s prescriptions for macroeconomic dynamics, and in particular fiscal policy, during
such transition episodes. They present simulated time-series data for an event window of eight
quarters before and after transition events recorded in the model simulations.21
Figure 4 shows that transitions into the crisis zone are driven by a sequence of bad produc-
tivity draws. In response to that, and despite fiscal effort in the form of increased taxation and
cuts in public spending to contain an excessive accumulation of debt, the debt-to-GDP ratio
increases and the crisis threshold declines, so that the economy approaches the crisis zone. At
some point (normalized as t = 0), staying out of the crisis zone becomes too costly as formal-
ized by (33). The government thus terminates its procyclical policy and implements a large
debt-financed fiscal expansion, reducing taxes and increasing public spending significantly. This
policy has a positive effect on contemporaneous output, but comes at the cost of pushing the
economy into the crisis zone as reflected by the surge in sovereign spreads. As productivity
recovers, the economy then moves to its new normal within the crisis zone, with a significantly
higher level of debt and, accordingly, a lower level of government spending and higher tax rates
compared to the initial situation.
Figure 4 also depicts the dynamics induced under a counterfactual policy that keeps debt just
below the crisis threshold and thus prevents exposure to the risk of self-fulfilling debt crises.
And Figure 5 compares the profile of period utilities (31) under the optimal countercyclical
21Recall that, under our baseline parameterization with β = 0.965, endogenous transitions occur only in
the form of entry events considered in Figure 4. The exit events in Figure 6 are therefore examined for the
specification with β = 0.967.
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(b) Debt and crisis threshold (yellow)




















































































































Figure 4: Fiscal policy when entering the crisis zone: optimal countercyclical policy (bold blue
line) versus counterfactual with procyclical policy preventing crisis zone entry (dashed red line)
policy against the counterfactual with procyclical fiscal policy. The fiscal expansion associated
with the optimal policy entails a utility gain at the time of crisis zone entry, which, however, is
relatively short-lived; after six quarters, the counterfactual starts to yield higher utility flows.
This is due to the depressed bond prices within the crisis zone, which force the government to
increase taxes and cut public spending (cf. Figure 4). Overall, the evident pattern of short-
run gain versus long-run pain again underscores the importance of the government’s degree of
relative impatience in striking the trade-off between competing frontoading versus consumption
smoothing motives.
Figure 6 examines fiscal policy when the economy leaves the crisis zone, with a time window
centered around the exit event (normalized as t = 0). As seen, transitions out of the crisis
zone are initiated during productivity booms. Public spending and the level of debt initially
rise in a procyclical fashion. However, given a sustained benign environment, the government
finds it eventually optimal to implement a severe fiscal contraction in order to escape the crisis
zone and create fiscal space for the future. The fiscal tightening associated with this policy
reversal involves both a substantial hike in tax rates and cuts in public spending, which set
28

















Figure 5: Period utility for crisis zone entry: optimal countercyclical policy (bold blue line)
versus counterfactual with procyclical policy preventing crisis zone entry (dashed red line)





































(b) Debt and crisis threshold (yellow)














































































































Figure 6: Fiscal policy when leaving the crisis zone (β = 0.967)
in some time before the realized exit event. This induces a fast-paced consolidation of debt,
which is driven below the crisis threshold within an average transition period of around five
quarters. The subsequent recovery of bond prices helps to relax the government budget. Taxes
and spending can therefore revert to normal levels, and fiscal policy resumes its procyclical
stance. As a result, GDP follows an M-shaped pattern, which reflects the dynamics of TFP
29
and taxation over time.
Another important take-away is that consolidations to leave the crisis zone occur only dur-
ing exceptional boom episodes, when productivity and output are significantly above trend.
Indeed, the debt reversal at t = −4 occurs when TFP is more than three standard deviations
above average. This is remarkable insofar as movements into the crisis zone happen already
during relatively mild recessions (cf. Figure 4, where the regime switch occurs when TFP is
just about one standard deviation below average).22 There is thus a fundamental asymmetry,
which distinguishes transition events into and out of the crisis zone. This asymmetry can be
explained with reference to condition (33), whose right-hand-side contains two factors implying
a tendency towards debt accumulation rather than decumulation: the government’s relative
impatience and the discounting of the expected future marginal utility via the option value of
default. Endogenous exits from the crisis zone are thus extremely rate events. For our baseline
calibration with β = 0.965, they do not occur at all; and under slightly reduced impatience
(β = 0.967), they are recorded with an unconditional quarterly probability of only 0.01%.
6 The Mexican debt crisis
The Mexican government’s inability to roll over its debt during December 1994 and January
1995 is widely interpreted as a self-fulfilling sovereign debt crisis. Our model provides a struc-
tural account of this episode, rationalizing the joint dynamics of sovereign debt and spreads
as the endogenous outcome of an optimal policy exercise where a discretionary, impatient gov-
ernment controls distortionary taxes and public spending in an otherwise benevolent way. The
narrative articulated in our model is based on the idea that a countercyclical policy stance
led to the accumulation of debt, which entailed the economy’s entry into the crisis zone. This
regime switch was reflected by a pronounced jump in sovereign spreads and ultimately led to a
series of failed debt auctions in December 1994 and January 1995.
In what follows, we discuss the political and economic developments surrounding the Mexi-
can debt crisis, building on previous literature, which also emphasizes the role of belief-driven
dynamics.23 In line with our quantitative model, we are particularly interested in the contri-
22The entry dynamics under β = 0.967 are very similar to those displayed in Figure 4 when β = 0.965.
23See e.g. Calvo and Mendoza (1996), Cole and Kehoe (1996) or Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a, 1996b).
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bution of fiscal policy to the course of events in the run-up to the rollover crisis in 1994-95.
We center our discussion of the situation in Mexico around Figure 7, which considers data
for a window of four years centered around the acute crisis event in December 1994 and January
1995. As seen in panel (a), GDP in Mexico was actually increasing until 1994:Q4. This benign
fundamental environment appears at odds with our model’s predictions about productivity and
output dynamics associated with entry events into the crisis zone (cf. Figure 4). However, it is
important to realize that this was not the information available to policymakers in real time.
Panel (a) therefore considers not only the deviation of GDP from trend (full sample, solid blue
line), but also the deviation from trend computed on the ‘real-time’ data sample from 1980:Q1
up to the respective point in time (dashed red line).24 The latter measure actually reveals that
GDP was below trend until mid 1994. That is, the situation perceived by policymakers was
arguably dire. Together with the tense political situation (among other things, an uprising
in Chiapas in January 1994 and the assassination of the ruling party’s presidential candidate
in March 1994) this induced a countercyclical fiscal expansion (see panel (d)) and ultimately
pushed GDP above trend in the second half of 1994.
Concurrent with these developments, the effective crisis threshold, beyond which self-fulfilling
debt crises become possible, was actually decreasing. This is because the government’s net liq-
uidity position became increasingly problematic, as it saw international reserves falling and
short-term (dollar-denominated) liabilities increasing. The driving force behind these devel-
opments was an expansionary monetary policy stance intended to stabilize the fragile politi-
cal climate. To prevent interest rate increases, the authorities expanded domestic credit and
replaced its maturing peso-denominated liabilities (cetes) by short-term dollar-denominated
bonds (tesobonos), thus shortening the maturity structure; see panels (b) and (c). In real,
consolidated terms, therefore, the economy was approaching the crisis threshold even though
GDP was expanding.25
Given this environment, fiscal policy would have needed to be more contractionary in order
These studies provide a detailed description not only of economic developments but also of the political context,
and we refer to them for a more complete picture of the Mexican debt crisis.
24Compared to the HP-trend computed over the whole sample (1980:Q1 to 2018:Q4), this ‘real-time’ trend
has the additional advantage of not being contaminated by the contraction of GDP during the economic crisis
of 1995.
25See Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez (2018) for a formal analysis of international reserves in a model of
rollover crises.
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Figure 7: Macroeconomic dynamics during the Mexican debt crisis
to prevent entry into the crisis zone. This is also the normative prescription articulated in
much of the earlier literature (Cole and Kehoe, 1996; Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco, 1996b). By
contrast, our model rationalizes the empirically observed behavior as potentially optimal in
view of the government’s competing motives for frontloading versus smoothing consumption;
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compare Figure 5 above.
Leaving this normative question aside, the fact remains that there was no significant tighten-
ing of fiscal policy in Mexico during 1994; instead, both taxation and public spending remained
broadly expansionary. This is most evident for public spending. Panel (d) of Figure 7 depicts
the evolution of government consumption. As seen, government consumption was on an in-
creasing trend between 1993:Q1 and 1994:Q4, which was only reversed in 1995, that is, the
time after the debt crisis had already materialized. The situation for taxes is somewhat less
conclusive. Panel (e) presents the evolution of the Mexican tax index, which shows no signif-
icant realignment during the considered period. Notice, however, that while the tax index is
a comprehensive measure of fiscal revenue management, its construction via tax revenues (see
Appendix A.3.1 for details) means that it remains endogenous to the business cycle. A more
direct measure of the government’s intentions for discretionary revenue management is available
from the IMF Tax Policy Reform Database (Amaglobeli, Crispolti, Dabla-Norris, Karnane, and
Misch, 2018). The database identifies four major tax reforms in the immediate run-up to the
rollover crisis, all of them expansionary (lower tax rates on a smaller base for personal and
corporate income tax). In early 1995, there was another expansionary reform, but in 1995:Q2,
there was a strong reversal due to the increase of the VAT rate from 10% to 15%. The above
reform packages had also an expenditure component going in the same direction; for example,
the 1995:Q2 hike in VAT was accompanied by a planned cut in programmable public spending
of nearly 10%.26
The empirically observed pattern of tax and spending adjustments kept debt initially more
or less stable – both in absolute terms and relative to GDP. Starting in mid 1994, however,
there began a process of accelerated debt accumulation, with external public debt (consolidated
with Banco de Mexico) rising from 11.4% of GDP in 1994:Q2 to 20.2% in 1994:Q4 and 28.5% in
1995:Q1. This rise in debt pushed the economy into the crisis zone, reflected in an increase of
sovereign spreads from 5.5% to 11.1% between 1994:Q4 and 1995:Q1 and then even further to
19.6% in 1995:Q2. Panels (f) and (g) of Figure 7 show the joint dynamics of debt and spreads
in Mexico. In panel (h) we also report the Mexican trade balance, which underlines the sharp
reversal in capital flows (net external borrowing) experienced between 1994:Q4 and 1995:Q1. In
26Meza (2008) examines the contribution of the strong reversal in fiscal policy to the 1995 contraction of
output.
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sum, therefore, the dynamics of key macroeconomic aggregates during the Mexican debt crisis
of 1994-95, and in particular the countercyclical adjustments in taxation and public spending,
conform broadly with the model’s predictions summarized in Figure 4.
7 Conclusions
This paper integrates rollover risk into a model of sovereign debt sustained by endogenous
default costs. We use this framework to study how sovereign risk – both fundamental and self-
fulfilling – shapes the government’s optimal debt policy and the cyclical behavior of taxes and
public spending. Central to the fiscal policy problem is the trade-off between the government’s
motives to frontload and to smooth consumption. Optimal taxes and spending are generally
procyclical, but the incidence of rollover risk gives rise to infrequent episodes of severely coun-
tercyclical fiscal activity. These regime changes occur endogenously when the economy enters or
leaves the crisis zone. Transitions into the crisis zone occur following relatively mild recessions
that are sustained enough to make the government adopt expansionary measures in the form of
tax cuts, an increase in spending and the issuance of public debt, although this increases future
borrowing costs. By contrast, transitions out of the crisis zone happen only during exceptional
boom periods, which are exploited by the government as an opportunity to decumulate debt in
order to eliminate rollover risk and reduce future borrowing costs. In normal times, however,
it is too costly for the government to escape the crisis zone, so that debt displays substantial
persistence within the crisis zone and is issued in a procyclical fashion.
These normative predictions are broadly supported by empirical evidence. In addition to
our discussion of the Mexican debt crisis in Section 6 above, Abbas, Belhocine, El-Ganainy, and
Horton (2011) examine historical debt dynamics in advanced and emerging economies (1870-
2007) and decompose 128 identified episodes of large debt increases and decreases into their
respective budgetary determinants.27 They document that strong growth is a consistent feature
of most pronounced debt consolidations; (peacetime) debt buildups tend to be driven by weak
growth or recessions, but in comparison to debt reductions the picture is somewhat less clear-
27Even though Abbas, Belhocine, El-Ganainy, and Horton (2011) restrict their decomposition exercise to
advanced economies, their data shows that large debt increases and decreases are common also in emerging
economies and low-income countries. Notice also that debt reductions are engineered through default only in a
small number (7) of the recorded cases (68).
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cut. Moreover, the documented large debt swings appear hard to rationalize as the cyclical
response to underlying productivity shocks only. Instead, our model, where – conditional on
being in the crisis zone – rollover risk is not tied to fundamentals and thus constant, offers a
plausible explanation: When fiscal policy is subject to a frontloading motive, the optimal policy
exploits the fact that bond prices remain locally invariant to the level of liabilities and brings
debt close to the default frontier. And conversely, successful fiscal consolidations must bring
down the stock of debt sufficiently to escape the crisis zone. We leave the systematic empirical
analysis of these patterns for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Optimal fiscal policy
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove the converse statement that ε 6∈ Γ(b, ξ) implies ε 6∈ Γ(b̃, ξ).
Let (c, L, g) denote the equilibrium values for consumption, labor supply and public expenditure
under the optimal fiscal policy (d = 0, τ, g, b′) when debt is equal to b. Now consider the
situation when debt is equal to b̃ < b and suppose the government policy remains unchanged
at (d = 0, τ, g, b′). From (30), bond prices are then unchanged; and since the private-sector
equilibrium is completely determined by (d = 0, τ ; ε), the resulting allocation then has c̃ = c and
L̃ = L. Hence, since b̃ < b, the government budget constraint (21) implies that it is possible
to increase public spending to g̃ > g. Therefore, under the (possibly suboptimal) policy of
keeping fiscal policy unchanged bar the residual adjustment of g̃ > g, we have u(c̃− v(L̃), g̃) >
u(c− v(L), g) and b̃′ = b′. Hence, from (22),
Vnd(b̃, ε) > Vnd(b, ε).
Moreover, the default value Vd(ε) is independent of the endogenous state b. By assumption,
ε 6∈ Γ(b, ξ), that is,
Vnd(b, ε) ≥ Vd(ε).
It then follows from the last two inequalities that ε 6∈ Γ(b̃, ξ).











When the government has access to credit markets and b′ > 0, its budget constraint (21) implies
g = τc+ q(b′, ε)b′ − b,
whereby the bond price is determined by (30) and thus unaffected by variations in τ . Moreover,
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with GHH preferences as in (1), labor supply is independent of consumption and the optimality


















[y − P ∗(r∗)m∗] = 1
1 + τ
gdp.















































From the definition of GDP in (20), gdp = y−P ∗(r∗)m∗, and since factors earn their marginal
































































It is then immediate to verify that this condition implies uc < ug.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Observe first that the multiplier attached to the government budget





g = τc+ q(b′, ε)b′ − b.












+ βEVb(b′, ε′, ξ′) = 0,
where ∂gdp
∂b′
= 0 because, given the static nature of the private-sector equilibrium, the endogenous
variable gdp is not affected by debt issuance. Since Vd(ε), the value function following default
(no matter whether it occurred for fundamental or self-fulfilling reasons), does not depend on
b, the envelope condition is
Vb(b, ε) =
 0, if ε ∈ Γ(b, ξ),Vndb (b, ε), if ε 6∈ Γ(b, ξ),
where



















Since the level of maturing debt b affects the endogenous variables L and gdp not directly, but





the envelope condition further simplifies to Vndb (b, ε) = −ug. The generalized Euler equation




















The generalized Euler equation can therefore be rewritten as






denotes the elasticity of bond prices with respect to debt issuance.
A.2 Debt policy functions
Figure 8 considers families of debt policy functions for different realizations of the productivity
shock: median TFP (ε = 1) and variations to low (ε = 0.904) and high (ε = 1.106) TFP.
Comparison of the debt policy functions for the case when β = 0.965 with those when β = 0.967






















(a) β = 0.965






















(b) β = 0.967
Figure 8: Debt policy functions
reveals a key difference. Starting in the vicinity of the crisis-zone fixed point of the debt
policy function associated with the median TFP shock (bold blue line), consider a sequence
of (sufficiently pronounced) shocks that increases TFP persistently so that dynamics are now
driven by the high-TFP policy function (dashed green line). When β = 0.965 (panel (a)), this
leads to increased accumulation of debt and convergence to a new, higher fixed point within the
crisis zone. By contrast, when β = 0.967 (panel (b)), the dynamics result in debt decumulation
and convergence to a new, lower fixed point located within the safe zone, that is, an endogenous
exit from the crisis zone.
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A.3 Data
Empirical data used for calibration and the discussion of Section 6 has been obtained mainly
from Banco de México (http://www.banxico.org.mx/). The GDP deflator is constructed
using data from Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010) and the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/). Spread data is from World Bank Global Economic
Monitor (https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/global-economic-monitor). We
cover the period 1980:Q1-2018:Q4, where necessary extending the series available from Banco
de México with data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. In particular, we use or
construct the following series:
- Gross domestic product (current prices): series SR16501
- Gross domestic product (constant prices, seasonally adjusted): series SR16515
- Private consumption (constant prices, seasonally adjusted): series SR16519
- Government consumption (constant prices, seasonally adjusted): series SR16520
- Exports (constant prices, seasonally adjusted): SR16524
- Imports (constant prices, seasonally adjusted): SR16516
- GDP deflator: Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010) and FRED
- Inflation rate: percentage change in GDP deflator
- Tax revenues (non-oil related, pesos): SG259
- Income tax (pesos): SG80
- Value added tax (pesos): SG81
- Excise taxes (pesos): SG54
- Real tax revenue: (SG80 + SG81 + SG54)/GDP deflator
- Tax rate: real tax revenue/private consumption
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- Tax index: 0.842*tax rate + 0.158*inflation rate (see Appendix A.3.1)
- International reserves (US dollars): SF31991
- Tesobonos (pesos): SF229692
- Cetes (pesos): SF65047
- Total government securities (pesos): SF65219
- Total broad economic debt of the public sector (pesos): SG193
- External broad economic debt of the public sector (pesos): SG195
- External broad economic debt of the public sector consolidated with Banco de México
(pesos): SG201
- J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Spread (EMBI+): World Bank Global Economic
Monitor
A.3.1 Tax index
The empirical measure for tax rates reported in Table 3 is constructed as a tax index based
on revenue data from VAT taxes (series SG81), income taxes (series SG80), excise taxes (se-
ries SG54) and the inflation tax. Taken together, the revenue from the ‘fiscal’ taxes (that is,
the sum of VAT taxes, income taxes and excise taxes) averages at approximately 12% of pri-
vate consumption expenditures over the period 1980-2018. During the same period, seignorage
amounted to about 1.5% of GDP, which corresponds to approximately 2.25% of private con-
sumption. Notice that the respective percentages can be interpreted as an implicit tax rate
applied to private consumption as a tax base. In line with their relative role for government
revenue, the tax index assigns a combined weight of 12/(12+2.25) = 84.2% to VAT, income
taxes and excise taxes, and the remaining 2.25/(12+2.25) = 15.8% to inflation. The resulting
tax index is thus mainly determined via the fiscal side, but has a comprehensive enough cover-
age to also capture the non-negligible role of seignorage for public finances. Since the volume of
the different sources of public revenue is observed at quarterly frequency, the tax index displays
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a fair amount of variability over the business cycle. Panel (d) of Figure 7 in the main text plots
the tax index for a time window centered around the Mexican debt crisis of 1994-95.
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